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Article 3

JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
Anton-Hermann Chroust*
No effort is made here to define either law or jurisprudence in any special
sense. This has been done, with varying success, by a host of jurists, philosophers
and moralists. To enumerate their contributions, from the time of early Greek
speculation to the latest theories, would fill a middle-sized library. It might be
permissible, however, to entitle the philosophic viewpoint expounded here "NeoSociological Jurisprudence." This particular approach to law and jurisprudence
is based upon the realization of the general human vulnerability and the vast
difference in the psychological reactions by different people to their experiences
within social life. It is conscious of the almost infinite and vastly different (and
often conflicting) claims made by different individuals or groups of individuals.
It takes into account the limited human understanding, the instability of human
emotions, the exhaustibility of human patience and the limited human altruism,
and especially the widespread human tendency towards overbearance, aggressiveness and even cruelty, which as often as not is but a manifestation of misdirected
self-assertiveness. It also includes in its considerations the realization that human
and natural resources are both limited and vulnerable. Within a pluralistic
though reasonably cooperative society all these factors of existential reality call
for a policy which restricts and restrains, by a variety of means and as far as this
is humanly possible, the use of violence and outright destructiveness. This might
be achieved, at least in part, by fostering a general attitude of forbearance and
compromise through policies of fair exchange, workable division of labor, equitable distribution of assets and liabilities, and by joint as well as intelligent planning of desirable and acceptable goals and efficient methods of realizing them by
channeling human aspirations, expectations and capabilities.
Above all, law is considered here to be something that is vitally and viably
related to existential reality and fact, to historical experience and existence, and
to the results of empirical science and scientifically ascertainable data. In this
fact-conscious frame of reference, law, that is, a realistic conception of law and
its proper function, must always be inspired by, and readily conducive to, an
appropriate understanding and appreciation of the multiple social structures and
processes which in their totality constitute a dynamic, efficient, viable and essentially free society composed of persons aware of their moral, political, economic
and personal importance, and psychological identity. While earnestly concerned
with the common incidents of grievance, offense and litigation (encountered in
any lively society and normally controlled or resolved by small-scale and shortrange though necessary remedial "patch-up-practices"), law must look beyond
mere remedial or preventive action. As a matter of fact, frequently it must or
should act prior to the need for corrective realignment. In brief, law must realistically and in a spirit of "managerial concern" come to grips with the many and
frequently complex large-scale and long-range problems and conflicts which
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, J.U.D., University of Erlangen, 1929;
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unavoidably arise from what appear to be the three most telling and most urgent
quests of our time (and probably of all times) : First, the almost universal demand
for greater and more adequate or equitable sharing in the social, economic and
political powers inherent in any differentiated or articulated society; second, the
urgent insistence upon greater security in the many domains-not only of social,
economic and political activities or pursuits, but also in the areas of man's
physical and psychological health-which include the menacing issues of ecology,
pollution, the devastating threat of senseless depletion of human and natural resources, and the frightening possibility of turning the whole earth into a revolting
slum or technological jungle; and, third, the perennial search for greater and
more realistic recognition of man's human dignity, human worth and human individuality, a recognition which can be realized realistically and effectively only
through adequate sharing and adequate security.
In order to acquire and maintain any truly meaningful function beyond
mere "negative policing," law must seek to bring about a sound and workable
distribution of power and liability in the constantly shifting social, economic and
political domains of human existence, in reasonable human aspirations and in
justifiable human expectations. In a thoroughly realistic manner and fortified by
the scientific findings of psychology, sociology, economics and historical knowledge, law must always face up to the extremely involved problems inherent in a
healthy distribution of the national income, in the complex issues of human
prestige and in the perpetual struggle over the social, economic and political
powers. For the sake of economic and psychological security, it must assign a
foremost place to individual human dignity in all areas of social, economic and
political pursuits-to a sound and realistic humanitarianism rather than to empty
emotional preachments about "human rights." More concretely, it must effectively and intelligently counteract recurrent social and economic breakdowns
which in the past have led to widespread insecurity and misery, frightful human
crises and dislocations, and terrifying revolts which, as often as not, have made
a mockery of human dignity and a shambles of harmonious coexistence. It might
be appropriate to point out here that aside from moral or humane considerations,
the intelligent and effective confrontation of these major issues is often purely a
matter of social, economic and political survival. To treat these urgent matters
humanely and with a sensitive and well-informed awareness of the causal factors
underlying these problems is frequently nothing other than a realistic manifestation of that mutual respect and deference in which any truly free democratic
society must be rooted. Only thus may we ever hope for a modicum of the social
peace which any societal structure requires for its ultimate survival. Social peace,
then, must also include the conditions of continuing peace, that is, a sensitive
awareness of the factors that will probably guarantee social peace. True social
peace, however, demands more than freedom from physical violence. It must
include the freedom to attain, maintain and enhance, by peaceful and noncoercive means, the social, economic and political value position to which all
healthy and normally motivated men aspire in their perennial quest for greater
sharing, greater security and greater recognition.
Only by taking full and realistic account of all these crucial facts and
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problems and their psychological as well as human impact-of their constant and
often perplexing though always fluid interplay with other issues-can law ever
hope to do "justice" and to work effectively in the creation, maintenance and
expansion of those individual, collective and political values, interests, aspirations
and expectations which are so essential to the life and growth of a truly free,
enlightened and peaceful society. Only by understanding and acknowledging the
existence as well as the fundamental significance of these problems and issues can
law handle the many worthwhile challenges and counterchallenges which the
ever-restless democratic man, or the differentiated or undifferentiated group with
which he identifies himself, voices in the perennial pursuit of happiness and the
more perfect and more dignified humanity both on individual and collective
levels. In our particular age every known economic, social and political system
is confronted by pressing challenges and counterchallenges. If properly understood, competently analyzed, and realistically appraised as to their origins, factual
significance and decisive impact upon men in general-if, in other words, they
are intelligently and sensitively met in attention to their likely practical, psychological and emotional consequences--these challenges and counterchallenges
may in fact furnish the basis for a new, more realistic, more fruitful and more
workable approach to law and jurisprudence in general.
The first integral element of a realistic fact-related approach to law, therefore, is the concept of challenge. Social, economic or political challenge constitutes a conspicuous and readily discernible fact. It is usually articulated in a
specific demand or in a series of interrelated demands, expectations and aspirations, frequently referred to as "interests." A large-scale social and economic
demand such as, for instance, the quest for greater economic security may find
articulation in the insistence upon a guaranteed minimum annual wage, a more
adequate pension plan or in joining an organization, while the quest for greater
economic sharing may be expressed in the demand for higher wages or fringe
benefits. The insistence upon greater and more realistic recognition of human
dignity may be contained in a call for improved working conditions, more sensible
working hours, "released time" and a greater voice in production processes. These
challenges, which frequently arise within existing or developing social, economic
and political systems, are often of a vital and even decisive nature. Because they
also manifest important psychological factors or reactions, they are frequently
voiced in a threatening or violent manner. If they are left wholly unattended or
if, for the purpose of superficial "life-easing expediency," they are merely partly,
superficially or inadequately attended to in a temporizing "patch-up attitude,"
they may ultimately lead to uncontrollable violence and perhaps to the destruction
of the very system which either fails or refuses to deal with them effectively,
intelligently or satisfactorily.
Law, then, rather than asking itself exclusively a host of relatively irrelevant
or "secondary" analytical questions about some canons of formal construction,
modes of abstract legal reasoning or lines of judicial authorities, would do better
to raise the only questions which, in the long run, really matter: Which overall
course of action most likely is going to serve best the healthy survival of a truly
free and meaningfully humane society? Which general policy most likely will
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improve the overall human condition? How can a free and humane society and
its multiple differentiated or undifferentiated structures, interests and aspirations
best be managed so as to strengthen truly democratic-humanitarian processes? The
far-reaching practical (and moral) significance of these extremely complex questions and the necessity of supplying intelligent, well-informed and workable
answers rather than purely "dogmatic preachments" become increasingly apparent as we approach the many challenging and often puzzling problems connected with the sensible promotion and management of social, economic and
political activities and aspirations of men, and their meaningful interplay and
interdependence.
Law, understood solely in its technical or "legalistic" sense, cannot possibly
hope to cope exhaustively and effectively with the almost infinite complexities of
individual or collective action, aspiration and expectation. In this sense it can
never be scientific in the traditional or narrow sense of the term. And most
certainly, it cannot be a closed and presumably self-sufficient system of abstract
concepts, norms, rules or principles, or a matter of purely technical skills and
professional techniques. Law must always realistically, sensitively and constructively rely upon and make use of the findings of the empirical sciences. In
certain areas and, as a matter of fact, often in the most crucial areas of human
interrelations and interactions, law must frequently confine itself to devising
solutions of a flexible design. Such solutions, aside from bespeaking a laudable
honesty, needless to say, are frequently of a provisional or pliant nature. Yet,
despite their tentativeness, these solutions must realistically, vitally and viably be
related not only to a factual and expert understanding but as well to an appraisal of the broader social structures, or the manifold differentiated substructures, which have their own unique actuality, goals and functions. They must
also envision the practical though not always exactly predictable effects-social,
economic, psychological and political-which any announced legal policy may
have or is expected to have. Moreover, they must realistically take into account
the far-reaching impact which the constantly changing (though not always predictable) technological developments have or may have upon man and his mental,
psychological and moral make-up, and on the available human and natural
resources.
In order to be realistically workable and effective, law and legal policy must
be molded and determined by calculation of reasonable probabilities as well as
by adept and skillful application of the principle of efficiency. In the face of
conflicting challenges, it must make proper, that is, realistic and goal-determined
choices among several possibilities or alternatives. Hence, the "logic" of a realistic
law or realistic legal policy, which always rests on sensible and factually wellinformed choices, experiments and compromises, must be a logic of predicting
reasonable probabilitiesrather than a hairsplitting logic of formal deduction or
abstract inference. It is exactly the rather absurd and, in fact, impossible proposition that all legal decisions should flow with the necessity of formal logic from
antecedently known premises that lies at the bottom of all those theories of
jurisprudence which desperately though not always convincingly attempt to
glorify the old-which, by insisting upon a misplaced reverence for antiquated
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notions, outdated ideas and archaic views-actually strengthen ever-present antiprogressive and, hence, antihumanitarian prejudices. Adherence to such outdated-and unrealistic notions, which often seek their ultimate refuge and justification in formal logic, actually widens the fatal gulf between law and life and, in
consequence, is bound ultimately to breed contempt for, and irritation with, the
law.
The ultimate nature of a realistic and fact-related law must be determined
by ascertaining how it works or probably will work: whether it promotes, or is
likely to promote, or whether it retards or defeats outright the attainment of
desired and desirable goals in the almost limitless realm of worthy and real human
aspirations and expectations. This, in turn, demands constant reappraisal and
renewed clarification of the concrete meaning of the envisioned policy goals at any
particular time and in any particular situation in order to determine whether the
means selected to achieve these goals are still appropriate, adequate and efficient
in light of changing conditions-whether these particular goals are still desirable
or acceptable in an ever-changing and ever-challenging social or economic
actuality. In this particular sense all social policy through law is always somewhat experimental and tentative and, hence, somewhat in flux-most decidedly
a shocking realization for those jurists who always insist upon the "certainty of
the law" and of the legal process.
No series of social experiments through law, however skillfully or benevolently planned and executed, can furnish an absolute guarantee that even
under the most favorable circumstances the best choice among several possible
choices has been made or will be made, or that any choice, based on efficiency,
is indeed the best choice. In view of the ever-changing fact-situations and human
conditions on which concrete decisions must be based, no solution can in fact
ever be called final or ideal. But the proper-intelligent, informed and humanechoices in framing solutions may greatly improve, at least on a provisional basis,
the fundamental practices of creating, distributing, preserving and equalizing all
humanly and socially significant values--of meeting more adequately, satisfyingly and effectively the ever-present demands and expectations for greater sharing, greater security and greater recognition. In this, law not only may expand
and deepen the real and meaningful liberty and, concomitantly, the true humanity
of the individual on all levels and in all areas, but it will also increase and fortify
man's sense of, as well as aspiration to realize, his individual importance, personal
dignity and irreplaceable significance through a newly defined and adequately
secured fullness of life, especially whenever such an expansion or increase meets
with the basic needs and hopes of man.
The proper choice in the solution of a social, economic or political problem
through the proper legal policy must also be evaluated in its relation to certain
intermediary goals and values-and in the final analysis and in a certain sense all
goals and values are intermediary-as well as in its meaningful relation to the
many intermediary processes that characterize an open, free and pluralistic society. The almost infinite number of intermediary goals, values and processes, their
likely integration as well as their intelligent and informed clarification and proper
inclusion in any "social calculus" frequently is of greater importance and pro-
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founder significance for true legal, social, economic, political and human progress
within our existential world than any single supreme and absolute value or goal.
Hence, a properly and effectively functioning law will frequently have to reject
the notion of, or insistence upon, a monolithic society under the rule of a single
ultimate principle-a fond notion of certain doctrinaire or Utopian philosophers
and a lethal instrument for ruthless autocrats. One single dominant goal or value,
no matter how exalted it may be, not only vitiates the meaning of all intermediary goals or values but very likely also suppresses and even destroys the individual and his particular or unique interests and aspirations which are so
essential for a viable differentiated society. In so doing, it will in the final
analysis destroy humanity in its real and essentially pluralistic meaning.
If law is meant to promote or assist in the promotion of human progress
rather than impede or retard this progress-if it is meant to reach beyond the
mere settlement of relatively small-scale offenses, petty grievances and impassionate litigations-it must constantly, rapidly, sensitively and intelligently respond to
man's many problems, often by resorting to compromise or to obviously temporizing partial solutions. In this it must rely and make use of every known and every
available method of scientific observation, determination and procedure that
might shed some light on these problems, including a thorough analysis and a
well-founded understanding of the origins, causes, components and likely trends
of every socially significant action, interest, expectation and aspiration. It must
concern itself with an exhausting study of existing, socially relevant trends as
well as with man's psychological responses or general reactions; that is, with his
participation in, opposition to or indifference towards these trends. It must also
attempt to project the future of these trends on the basis of past experiences,
always keeping in mind alternatives in case the anticipated or calculated future
development, due to some novel and revolutionary scientific, economic, technological, social, psychological or political development, should take an unexpected turn. The possibility of an intelligent and workable solution of the many
problems faced by the law, however, will be lost at the very outset if free and
unhampered access to all relevant facts or data, which must be marshalled without
fear or prejudice, is denied or made impossible, or when due to improper training,
deficient knowledge, stultifying propaganda, doctrinaire fanaticism, deeply rooted
prejudices, allegedly "timeless absolutes" or plain ill will, people are incapable
of distinguishing between fact and fiction, truth and fancy.
The fuller meaning no less than the general direction, intensity and justification of the many real social challenges and counterchallenges which constitute
an essential element of total life, can be determined and evaluated effectively
only on the basis of an unbiased clarification of fact. Such clarification requires
scientific methods of thinking and procedure. It calls for a vast amount of
integrated and interrelated modes of analytical thought, dispassionate observation, constructive insight and imaginative vision, including the efficient determination of the specific causes and concrete aims of every challenge or counterchallenge and the practical feasibility of these aims; a realistic determination of
the general direction and the speed with which specific challenges will develop
and expand; a calculation of their intensity and the passions involved in these
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challenges; an understanding of the various differentiated and undifferentiated
factors which produce and determine these challenges; and a reasonable prediction of the likely future course of these challenges. All this will have to be done
on the basis of historical experience, scientific skill, psychological understanding
and a kind of practical wisdom that is founded on information which is often too
diffused to permit exact definition. In other words, the competent clarification,
informed justification and realistic appraisal of the many aspects and facets that
make up any social challenge or counterchallenge demand judicious and proficient employment of all relevant modes of observation, analysis and intelligent
as well as humane thinking, which imaginatively and constructively put man
and human dignity above technical "constructionism," "legal logic," "judicial
authority," "due process" or "normative consistency."
As the deliberate result of realistic fact-clarification and fact-realization, of
goal-clarification and goal-thinking, of circumstance and opportunity, law must
constantly and consistently be re-evaluated and, whenever advisable or necessary,
revised in light of novel fact situations and new challenges and counterchallenges.
This re-evaluation or revision, in turn, must resort to imaginative thinking and
creative action. The almost limitless aspirations and expectations of man,
especially of democratic man, which reflect the social dynamics and constructive
vitality of any healthy and essentially happy (that is, free or open) society, are
of uppermost concern to a truly "living law"; and the proper handling of these
aspirations and expectations, together with a realistic though flexible goaldetermination, will ultimately determine the progress of a society and, as a
matter of fact, of each individual. The comprehending insight into the everfluid structures of all social reality and the diversified and often conflicting
challenges it engenders, is in itself a never-ending process and a perpetual challenge. This being so, realistic (that is, truly and healthily effective) law, being
related to this never-ending process and responsive to existential (that is, everchanging) reality, must itself be a series of never-ending processes which constantly will have to adjust to the dynamics of historical existence and humanitarian
reality. Probably the greatest tragedy that may befall secular man is a situation
where law and existential life in all its almost limitless ramifications and possibilities conflict with one another. Such a conflict always has lethal effects for
both law and life-for man and for the world in which he lives.
Admittedly, there are many senseless, irrational and inhuman things which
men do, always have done, and probably always will do. On the whole, human
history is a rather messy affair or, as one cynic has put it, "the onward flow of
human stupidity through the contingency of time." It must be conceded that
rational man too frequently behaves irrationally, and that much of this irrationality, which is also characteristic of many human institutions, actually results from
the haphazardness with which men form opinions and reach decisions, and engage
in irreversible actions. Many of the traditional legal policies and many social
or legal institutions are simply the result of his haphazardness and, hence, are
largely accidental as well as irrational rather than the deliberate result of intelligent, coherent and consistent planning. They are, in other words, often the
crystallization, generalization and "canonization" of the innumerable petty and
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temporizing ad hoc decisions or resolves man makes in daily living, under particular circumstances and in response to his personal prejudices. Accordingly,
society and its many subtle though complex institutions are often structured on
very tenous and unstable foundations. Substantial and worthwhile social
changes, however, can rarely if ever be initiated by violent revolutions, because
the latter almost always awaken and unleash those "demonic forces," destructive
impulses and murderous as well as suicidal instincts which are dormant in man.
In order to be practically meaningful, law must at all times rely upon
competent insights and evaluations of the many actual situations and factual
conditions with which it wishes to deal efficiently and effectively. It must be
developed, expanded, and applied in the multifarious processes of enlightened
goal-thinking, goal-planning and goal-acting where, with the aid of all pertinent
data, every relevant fact or factor determining human life or group-existence is
properly accounted for. It will have to be based upon skilled understanding and
expert appraisal of causal factors in the composite life of peoples and in the
multiple interactions and interrelations to be found in any composite, differentiated and lively society. Moreover, it must be conscious of the far-reaching
impact which the transition from a rural-agrarian economy and society to an
urban-industrial or urban-commercial society, and often to a frightful "urban
slum jungle," has upon people in general, not to mention the crucial effects
which modem industrialization has upon man's health, psychological make-up
and mental attitude, upon ecology and upon natural resources. And finally, law
must be appropriate to fact-related and fact-conscious responses to specific challenges arising from the ever-dynamic expectations or demands of man. It will
have to take into account not only technological and scientific advancements as
well as man's physical, mental and psychological reactions to them, but also
particular social or economic circumstances and the frequently sudden and even
explosive awakening of individuals or whole groups to their social, economic or
political powers. Furthermore, it must be conscious of the general fact that every
challenge most certainly will be met by a response which may become manifest
either in cooperation, passive resistance, or active and violent counterchallenge.
In order to retain meaningful and viable contact with these developments, law
must quickly and understandingly respond to the ever-growing but always varying
social, economic and political awareness of people. And it must acknowledge the
simple fact that different people are different rather than identical and, hence,
are much more than meaningless "symbols" or "formalistic abstractions." It must
be fully conscious of the fact that in modem times the demands, expectations and
pursuits of people are not only stimulated by popular education and mass media
but are also encouraged and elicited by public figures and "charismatic leaders"
capable of voicing these aspirations in "organized demands" and frequently
threatening language, often accentuated by the accumulation of bitter resentment
over long-endured neglect, discrimination, deprivation, frustration and gratuitous
humiliation.
The clarification, justification and appraisal of the dominant challenges of
our time-the quest for more adequate sharing, greater security and more realistic
recognition-call for more detailed explanations and discussions. To cite but one
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typical example which, incidentally, has affected our particular views concerning
labor law and labor relations: Present-day trends to maximize economic profits
and production volume through the introduction of standardized mass-produced
goods, that is, modem mass-production methods and techniques, have all but
destroyed or squelched the worker's feeling of personal creativeness, personal
achievement and the concomitant interest in true workmanship or joy for work,
not to mention the frequently deleterious effects they have on his physical and
psychological health and well-being. By now the average worker has lost the
vital sense of personal importance, personal significance and personal satisfaction
which is, or ought to be, the normal result of true creativeness. And without this
sense of importance and significance-without recognition-most men will feel
insecure, rejected, frustrated and unhappy, and in consequence will be driven to
take certain compensatory steps, usually in the form of drastic demands of all
sorts, which frequently are voiced in audible and even threatening language.
The usual mass-production processes of contemporary industrialization are
at best uninteresting not to say dispiriting. They are an exasperatingly and
monotonously dull though strenuous routine in which man gradually loses his
identity and any sense of personal accomplishment. This is especially true when,
for reasons of alleged efficiency and certainly for reasons of economy and speed,
the operations or techniques employed are wholly standardized and when, as a
consequence of this standardization, the worker feels that he is wholly meaningless-that he is immediately replaceable and that his contribution is utterly insignificant not to say "depersonalized"; when every urge to experiment and innovate, so typical of man's individual creativity, initiative and healthy curiosity,
is outright discouraged, discredited and, as a matter of fact, considered a liability;
when differences in personal talents and qualifications are frowned upon and
outright suppressed as a distinct disadvantage; when production schedules, production goals and production standards are invariably determined by others,
usually by a remote and disinterested fiat (disinterested in the worker as such);
when the work product is never explained to the worker as a significant and
valuable contribution to the well-being of society; when the emphasis is constantly and monotonously on quantity rather than on quality; and when, on
account of his social, economic and educational status, the worker is constantly
looked down upon by his alleged "superiors" or "betters" and, hence, is made to
feel that he is no longer, and perhaps never was, a significant and wanted member
of society.
These unpleasant facts, characteristic of modern mass-production methods,
can be ascertained, clarified and appraised as to their far-reaching effects upon the
working man and his whole mental, psychological and physical make-up, and
particularly upon his quest for security, his desire for recognition and his quest for
sharing. They have all but destroyed in him the vital and gratifying sense of importance and accomplishment. This tragic situation, to which a disproportionately
large number of people seem to be permanently and hopelessly condemned, can
neither evoke in man a sense of belonging, nor provide him with a feeling of
recognition or appreciation, nor bring out his particular talents and, hence, his
distinct individuality. Because such general conditions cannot possibly stimulate
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or call upon man's creative potential, they cannot possibly give him a sense of
power or control over his work or his product. On the contrary, the very system
makes him feel inferior to the machine, that is, to his tool and his product, not
to mention the "market," the salesman, the manager, the advertiser and the
customer. Left thus with a feeling of inferiority, frustration, insecurity, rejection,
contingency and anonymity, man will frequently react by trying to compensate
for the inadequacy of his particular situation or condition and recompense himself for this "injury," of which he is keenly aware, by making certain demands.
These demands he seeks to satisfy with an intensity which, due to psychological
factors, frequently border on frenzy or outright violence.
Among these compensatory reactions is, for example, an inordinate desire
to join. Membership in a union, therefore, is not merely prompted by the desire
to assert more effectively his economic, social or political power, influence,
recognition and security. To belong to such a collective organization also makes
the individual member feel important and wanted. Moreover, by joining a
union he satisfies his craving for power, influence and prestige, as well as his
deeply rooted longing for sharing, thus compensating for his distressing sense of
powerlessness in the mass-production process. The complete thwarting of all
creativeness and individual contribution or qualification, the realization that his
mechanical "replaceability" and utter lack of recognition or praise-all this
creates within the modem working man a sense of human and economic insecurity and frustration for which he attempts to compensate through collective
and, hence, more assuring action. Thus he will frequently make truculent
demands for greater economic returns, for a larger share in the profits, for more
"respect" and recognition and for larger economic or technical powers. And
finally, the almost complete personal insignificance to which he feels condemned
(and his sense of real or imaginary unwantedness) often results in a strong
compensatory insistence on a greater voice in economic, social and political
matters, if only by making the "big noise" that might attract some public attention
and recognition, be it even unfavorable or hostile.
This example, borrowed from the field of labor law and labor relations,
should make it sufficiently clear that all the above-mentioned facts and factors, in
the final analysis, are in some way related to the fundamental quest, voiced by
contemporary man, for greater sharing, greater security and greater recognition.
The reality as well as the causal factors of this quest can intelligently be clarified,
appraised, explained and also justified; and its origins, particular nature, component elements, intensity, direction and ultimate effects upon the whole of
social reality can be understood and, hence, translated into effective legal policy
and sensible and realistic legal action. If properly evaluated and open-mindedly
analyzed, all these facts and causal factors will shed much light on the origin and
particular nature of certain social challenges and counterchallenges that emerge
from man's perennial quest for greater sharing, greater security and greater recognition. Such insights will also supply a realistic, scientific and hence more workable foundation for the effective legal handling and channelling of these challenges and counterchallenges which, after all, are mainly man's reactions to
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certain existing conditions, as well as manifestations of his unique human identity
which man will never and should never, surrender.
Viewed in this manner and judged within such a factual context, it should
become rather obvious that efficient and workable law must be more than a
"command of the sovereign," a "set of norms for human conduct within a given
community," a "body of authoritative decisions," a "code," or a standard for
evaluating certain aspects of human behavior. Existential reality, it will have to
be admitted, is infinitely more complex than any legal absolutes or generalizations.
Hence, law may never be congealed into a static though perhaps "theoretically
sound" pattern which proceeds on the rather naive assumption that all issues, including the crucial task of survival, in the main are but a question of legal symbols
or a "juristic syntax." Neither is it a body of "technical doctrines" or a sort of
verbal manipulation of "disemboweled rules" wholly detached from those concrete facts and factors which it is supposed to regulate. Rather, it is a series of
variable processes of preventive and incentive channelling of human deportment
and human expectation both in general and specific situations which are always
concrete. Provided it is properly understood in its functional or managerial
meaning, law operates not only in the somewhat restricted though by no means
insignificant areas of ordinary offense, grievance and dispute, but also in the vast
and vital domains of patent and latent social and economic conflicts or tensions
of grave intensity and great dimension. It is preoccupied not merely with the
regulation, implementation or revision of certain existing conduct patterns, both
on an individual and collective level, but also with the adaptation of old and
generally accepted conduct patterns to novel and frequently rapidly changing
social, economic, political and technological conditions and their far-reaching
impacts on the lives and life-styles of people, on natural resources and on the
whole world in which we must live.
Law will also have to be concerned with and be interested in devising and
recommending, through incentive provisions, new conduct and expectation patterns which correspond more realistically and conform more readily to these novel
conditions and situations. If properly defined and understood in its profounder
and more meaningful relation to a truly free and open (democratic) society,
law must not merely appraise a definite conduct as to its tangible or likely significance for the realization of some definite though often limited individual,
social or political goals. It must also, as far as this is possible, deliberately channel
and influence human conduct and human expectation so as to bring about more
efficiently and more definitely a fuller realization of all human-individual and
collective-values and goals both in their differentiated and undifferentiated
aspects. In this sense, law may also become a realistic and workable vocalization
of these values and goals---of worthy human challenges and counterchallengesprovided it realizes that not all human problems can be fully resolved. Since a
workable law can never ignore humanism, it must also be conscious of the fact
that true humanism is an all-encompassing understanding and appreciation of the
vast and probably irreducible differences among men and their particular values,
expectations and aspirations. It is not a doctrinaire-absolutist commitment to
what certain "supermen" or "super-philosophies" consider to be the only accept-
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able "ideal." On the contrary, it insists on seeing men as they actually are rather
than as they "ought to be" according to some Utopian ideal.
All this, in turn, calls for unbiased comprehension of the values and goals to
be attained or promoted. It also demands a familiarity with effective as well as
economical means--economical as regards human and material resources-for
their realization. It calls for both the ability and the craftsmanship to encourage
and promote, often in a spirit of managerial wisdom, a conduct conducive to the
fullest realization of these aims. The law should, moreover, attempt, by noncoercive means, to create and implant new individual and social values and
goals, as well as a distinct and viable value awareness among people in general;
and it should also implement some significant traditional values by realigning
them with novel values or by relating them to so far ignored or misunderstood
values that are consonant with novel fact situations. Under certain circumstances,
law may even initiate a drastic and more realistic reorientation of individual and
collective human conduct, expectation and aspiration.
In the areas of constantly and often rapidly changing or shifting economic,
social, technological, psychological, physical or scientific realities, any existing
society and any legal system are constantly faced with the threat of serious and
even fatal breakdowns in the vital coordination and integration of life and work,
expectation and attainment, value and reality. It is in these perhaps most crucial
areas that a "fact-focused" and fact-conscious law becomes of paramount, not
to say decisive, importance. For unless man can become adapted and peacefully
reconciled to certain necessary or unavoidable changes within the social, economic,
technological or political environment in which he lives and intends to live, he
might very well use these changes to destroy this environment or system by resorting to either stubborn resistance or violent countermeasures. This is so
especially if, through misunderstanding, misinformation, propaganda, prejudice
or plain ignorance, he is led to believe that these changes are detrimental to him
or to the group with which he identifies himself, or that they are a deliberate, not
to say a diabolical, conspiracy against him and his convictions. Only too frequently do people identify "the other" or plain "otherness" with outright error
or evil, solely because it is "other" or "different," while they themselves and
whatever they stand for are obviously and always right and good simply because
they are not "the other." In brief, the "other," whether ethnically, racially or
confessionally, in itself is evil or at least inferior.
Law, then, if realistically understood and applied, may also become the sound
and durable foundation of a workable peace order and as such the basis of
intelligent social survival. It is a peace order not only in that it removes or
greatly reduces some patent or latent small-scale grievances, but also in that it is,
or can be, conducive to peaceful adjustment and constructive compromise in the
larger domains of human existence and coexistence, frequently through the rechannelling and reorientation of the reactions by the aggrieved or the questing,
or through the creation of novel values and novel challenges which deprive old
conflicts, aggravations and prejudices of much of their former meaning and,
hence, of their essentially irrational bitterness. In this manner law might also
minimize and perhaps even remove the chance for possible emotional counter-
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grievances or violent counteractions which, due to the ever-present human aggressiveness, selfishness and shortsightedness, always generate serious and often
fatal social disruptions in the decisive human quest for more adequate sharing,
more realistic security and more meaningful recognition. By achieving all this,
law, at least in part, might not only create novel, healthy and viable values and
implant as well as stimulate a new affirmative and constructive value awareness
as well as new healthy social goals based on sensible forbearance and compromise.
It may also secure these new values, goals and interests against the frequently recurring manifestations of man's proverbial inhumanity to man.
Law must at all times confront and attempt to resolve the manifold and
many-faceted fact-problems which underlie or arise from the perennial social,
economic and political struggles that are a characteristic aspect of any existential
and lively society. The intelligent, that is, efficient, peaceful and economic solution to all those fact-problems of existential reality frequently must be sought.
beyond the rather limited and not always satisfactory horizon of mere maintenance
or ad hoc repair. From mere intervention in case of a particularly revolting
abuse, law must expand into clear-cut goal-oriented policy action. It must do so
by realistically and humanely concerning itself with all those social, economic and
psychological factors which, being constantly at play, decisively affect and mold
the life and well-being of individuals, groups and whole social or political structures. But if law is to be purposive policy action-if it is to be effective and
humane "managerial policy thinking" rather than merely an abstract "sovereign
command," an allegedly "objective standard," a "threat," a "technical (judicial
or administrative) process," a "body of authoritative grounds of or guides for
official actions or decisions," or a "basis for predicting official action"-it must
be deliberately pliant in order to become an effective means to achieve desired and
desirable results within a rapidly changing world. The maxim that adaptability to
reality and circumstance is one of the prerequisites for successful survival also
applies to law and legal policy in general.
The proper law or legal policy, whether applied to a particular issue or to
an overall social, economic or political situation or condition-if properly
planned, skillfully managed, and efficiently carried out-injects real meaning and
tangible content into those human rights which are meant to be the expression of
a realistic understanding and full realization of human dignity and human worth.
True human dignity--the right to a full and relatively unhampered life and the
right to share properly and to be secure and respected-is more than abstract
"liberties," "human rights" or an integrated "grammar of legal semantics." It is
certainly more than empty though high-sounding and, hence, irritating preachments sonorously proclaimed on national holidays or during political campaigns.
As often as not, such preachments are just emotional phrases or ritualistic slogans
and, hence, in time may cause sufficient disappointment and resentment to bring
about drastic and perhaps fatal social disruptions as they frequently appeal to
aggressiveness and selfishness in the name of "human liberties" and "human
rights." Most people, it must be conceded, act solely for the purpose of realizing
purely selfish and even antisocial interests, while some people act primarily for
the purpose of arousing a feeling of dissatisfaction in others. Equally futile, not
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to say dangerous, are efforts to advertise mere legal technicalities as "democracy,"

"liberty," and the "fuller life" or "justice." Such an attitude is but the manifestation of an almost pathetic (or pathological?) readiness to accept statements solely
because they are preserved in law reports, treatises or codes, or even because they
are said to be found there. The desperate clinging to shopworn traditionalist views,
as a matter of fact, is actually a subconscious flight from reality; and the gradual
hardening of purely tentative answers into absolute dogmas is frequently nothing
more than a frantic though futile search for an unchanging and, hence, allegedly
comforting rule of life.
If the idea of a free democratic society under the rule of law is to be more
than a mere oratorical exercise-more than a meaningless lip service to human
freedom and dignity-then it must always be inspired by a spirit of mutual
respect and mutual deference in all domains of human beliefs, thoughts and
actions. In the realm of law and legal policy, such mutual respect and deference must manifest itself, and assume concrete forms, in the granting to all people
a more telling and more realistic recognition of their individuality, dignity and
irreplaceable importance through a fuller participation and sharing in all social,
economic and political powers, and through a more equitable security for all
men. At the same time, and probably on account of such an enlightened policy,
the individual will have, and must have, many unhampered outlets for the dictates
of his conscience, for his spiritual-religious commitments, for the attainment of
knowledge and wisdom, for the manifestations of personal integrity and virtue,
and for the exercise of his creativeness and craving after what he considers to be
true, good and beautiful. The law, therefore, must recognize and honor the competence of the individual in final matters of conscience, conviction and religious
belief, no less than in the ultimate questions of aesthetic taste, intellectual curiosity,
moral attainment and imaginative creativeness in all spheres and on all levels of
human activity. While the law will, and actually must, protect these essentially
personal concerns and aspirations of man, it may not invade them or even dictate
to them. It may never endanger the proper relation between private areas of living
and experiencing a full life, and the areas suitable to social control through law.
Through multiple guarantees and assurances, law must see to it that any unprovoked and unjustified threat to, attack upon and interference with these ultimate
human interests will effectively be repelled. At the same time, law must provide the
individual with, and effectively secure for him, much free play and ample leeway
so as to enable man to unfold his humanity and human dignity. It must also
stimulate this free play which is of utmost importance for the preservation and
stimulation of the dynamics and viability characteristic of a democratic society
and of democratic man living under an intelligent rule of law. And such an intelligent rule of law or legal policy must always be determined by the three most
urgent quests: sharing, security and recognition. Only thus may we avoid the
deadliness of a monolithic or closed society; and only thus may we hope to achieve
the greatest possible social harmony and still honor individual diversity.

